Binding Constraints: Does Firm Size Matter? by Vargas, Jose P Mauricio
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Binding Constraints: Does Firm Size
Matter?




MPRA Paper No. 41286, posted 13. September 2012 20:15 UTC
Binding Constraints: Does Firm Size Matter?




Using Bolivian rm level data from the World Bank 2010 Enterprise Survey,
we attempt to nd evidence to support the idea that distinct formal rms (ac-
cording to their size) have a distinct likelihood of facing obstacles. We propose
that a potential endogeneity between rmsconstraints and rm size should be
considered.
After calculating estimations from an IV-ordered probit with an ordinal en-
dogenous regressor, the results suggest that the rm size a¤ects the constraint
level reported by rms, but not for all kind of obstacles. Corruption, Political
Instability, and Crime, Theft and Disorderare obstacles which a¤ect all rms;
Electricityand Transportationare binding constraints to medium and large
rms; and Access to Financingis a binding constraint to small rms.
These ndings are important because they can be directly extrapolated to
public policy that is focused on the performance of rms.
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1 Introduction
The causes and e¤ects of rms behavior are a fruitful eld in economic research.
Recognizing that rms represent the primary unit of production process we should
accept that public policy must be technically oriented to improve its performance.
This paper attempts to bring new results on two branches of rms empirical evi-
dence: i) relationship between rm size and rmsconstraints, and; ii) rmsbinding
constraints.
Our paper has two objectives. First, we seek to verify whether level of rms
constraints depends on rms size (i.e. small rms reported that they face more
problematic obstacles than large rms or medium rms). In terms of public policy,
our evidence will support an answer to the question: how do policies demanded
by small rms di¤er from those demanded by other entrepreneurs? Our revision
of theory and empiric researchs on rms size and rms constraints (see section 2)
suggest a potential endogeneity that should be considered between both variables.
Sometimes, rm size could be a¤ected by a rms constraint, while some other times
the rmsconstraints are explained by rm size. Second, we examine which are the
most binding constraints for Bolivian entrepreneurs distinguishing between small,
medium, and large rms. Our approach to identify the most binding constraint is
based on the likelihood of facing more trouble (conditional on rm size).
Using the World Bank Enterprise Survey (ES) 2010, we count on a sample for
formal small, medium, and large rms in the three main cities of Bolivia. The ES is
meant to be representative of non-agricultural private sector bolivian economy, ex-
cluding rms with less than 5 employees1. In this sample, each enterprise identies
the obstacle level (throughout an ordinal scale) associated to 16 potential constraints
for the functioning of the rms. This set of constraints permit us to develop a diag-
nostic parallel to that of [14]Hausmann, Rodrick & Velasco (HRV) (2005), looking for
identifying the binding constraints, taking into account distinct rms characteristics
(with emphasis on rms size).
Besides, the ES database permits us to use a novel estimation method: the Con-
ditional (Recursive) Mixed-Process Model (CMP). We use this method to estimate
models for every potential obstacle rms face, considering constraint levels as func-
tions of an ordinal regressor which is potentially endogenous (rm size). The CMP
model allows us to nd empirical evidence of the potential endogeneity described
above, and it also permits us to answer (in presence of endogeneity) if size matters
when explaining the rmsconstraints (see section 4).
Our results suggest that rm size, and other rmscharacteristics such as the
ownership structure and industry matter when analyzing rms constraints, but not
for all the obstacles considered. This conclusion is valuable because it would imply
that we should consider distinct public policy orientation for distinct rm character-
1"The sample is consistently dened in all countries and includes the entire manufacturing sector,
the services sector, and the transportation and construction sectors. Public utilities, government
services, health care, and nancial services sectors are not included in the sample." (World Bank,
2007)
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istics. Also, we were able to identify that some constraints a¤ect all kind of rms
broadly, while some other constraints are specic by rm size; we compute an obsta-
cle ranking which conrms that Corruption, Informalityand Political Instability
seem to be common obstacles to all rms, while public services provision would be a
problem for medium and large rms, particularly Electricityand Transportation
represent considerable obstacles for large rms and medium rms, and Telecommu-
nications for medium rms. Another fact worth of mentioning is that Access to
Financingwould be an important obstacle only for small rms.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section two, we briey describe the
state of art on research about the rm size and rmsconstraints causes and e¤ects,
and the background about binding constraints literature with scope on enterprises
performance. Section three shows some descriptive statistics of the rmsbehavior
in Bolivia. Fourth section details the specications of the models proposed. Section
ve describes the results, and nally, section six summarizes the main ndings.
2 Literature Review
We will begin our literature review showing main results on papers related with rm
size and rms constraints. We support that there is enough evidence to suggest a
potential endogenity between both concepts. After that, we briey review binding
constraints literature, and show a framework able to support identication of Bolivian
most binding rmsconstraints.
The analysis of rmsconstraints and the determinants of rms size are elds
that have been taking importance in the last years. One of the reasons for this
expansion might be the availability of panel data and cross section databases, almost
exclusively designed for characterizing rmsbehavior. These two elds will be the
scope of our research. Their importance is evident considering that rms are the
primary unit of production and therefore their behavior and success will determine
the output growth and success of the whole economy.
Firmsconstraints could be considered as external factors2 which a¤ect the deci-
sions to become an entrepreneur and the rm success, but as we will support below,
their e¤ects are not neccesarily homogeneous between distinct rm sizes nor exoge-
nous. Analogously, the rm size could be considered as an endogenous decision of
the rm, furthermore, it could be related with the rms constraints. Below, we
briey develop the state of art in both points: rms constraints and rms size.
Our intention is to support the links between rm´s size with rm´s constraints,
and its importance to determine the entrepreneur behavior and the entrepreneurship
success.
2As we will see in Section 4, we consider a set of rms perceptions that includes the following
potential constraints: Infrastructure and Services (Electricity); Sales and Supplies (Transporta-
tion, Customs and Trade Regulations, Informality); Access to Land; Functioning of the Courts;
Crime; Government Relations (Tax Rates, Tax Administration; Business Licensing, Macroeconomic
Instability, Political Instability, Corruption); Financing; Labor (Labor Regulations, Inadequately
Educated Workforce).
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With regards the rst point, rmsconstraints have been studied from di¤erent
methodologies and several regional and causal scopes. Some research papers identify
rm´s constraints as determinants of entrepreneurship or rms performance, while
some others study the determinants of these constraints. In the former group, [2]
Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) (using micro dataset for thirty-seven developed and
developing countries [GEM project]) focused on individual characteristics and on
countriesregulatory di¤erences - and by means of estimating probit and IV-probit
models - nd that entrepreneurship is determined by individual characteristics, and
that these last ones could be a¤ected by regulations. [16] Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994)
nd that inheritance (and inheritance size) a¤ects the individual decision to become
an entrepreneur. These ndings would be consistent with the e¤ects of liquidity con-
straints over entrepreneurship. Their results are based on individual tax returns data
for U.S. which are the input for the estimation of a probit model where the depen-
dent variable is the transition from wage earning into entrepreneur. In an approach
similar to the previous, [18] Johansson (2000) uses the Longitudinal Employment
Statistics of Finland between the years 1987-1995. His strategy was to estimate a
probit model for the probability of making a transition from wage employment into
self-employment. The results show that individuals level of wealth is a signicant
variable to explain this transition positively, thus suggesting the existence of liquid-
ity constraints. On the other hand, [17] Hurst & Lusardi (2004) propose that the
relationship between wealth and entry into entrepreneurship is essentially at over
the majority of the wealth distribution (below the 95 percentile), and there is no ev-
idence that wealth matters more for businesses requiring higher initial capital. This
shows, according to the authors, that liquidity constraints while possibly important
for some households are not a major deterrent to small business formation in the
United States, even though they could a¤ect the optimal scale of the business.
But, the literature on rmsconstraints is not only devoted to analyze nancial
restrictions. Some studies, as [24] Parker & van Praag (2005) emphasise the role of
human capital on entrepreneurial performance. They develop a theoretical model
which includes not only capital constraints but investment of founders in human
capital, taking into account potential endogeneity between these variables. Their
empirical approach estimates an instrumental variable model using a cross section
sample of dutch entrepreneurs for the 1995 year. Their main ndings are: there are
evidence that supports treating human and nancial capital as endogenous variables;
lower capital constraints lead to greater entrepreneurial performance; more years of
educations (human capital) is asociated with lower capital constraints; extra years
of schooling enhance entrepreneurial performance.
Besides, rmsconstraints were not only analyzed as determinants of change from
wage earning into entrepreneur, but as determinants of the successful of the rms.
For example, literature on credit constraints suggest ([12] Greenwald and Stiglitz
1993; [26] Schiantarelli 1995) that they can cause a misallocation of resources in rm
production and a¤ect rms protability. In this framework, Rizov (2004), using
balance sheets and prot and loss counts for Bulgaria (between 1997 and 1999), shows
that rms with credit constraints have smaller protability. In a similar approach,
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[13] Halabí and Lussier (2010), in a study for the Chilean economy estimate an
ordered probit model, that shows that rms which face larger constraints (structural
constraints such as internet use or nancial constraints such as working capital)
decrease their probability to succeed.
Nevertheless, despite what we mentioned so far, the attention to the rmscon-
straints is not only devoted to its analysis as an exogenous variable but as an en-
dogenous one. In the theoretical eld, [8] Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) propose
a dynamic model to derive endogenous borrowing constraints which arise as part of
the optimal design of a lending contract under asymmetric information. From the
empirical side, [15] Hobdari et al. (2009), using a panel data for Estonian companies
between years 1993 to 2002, nd that the probability of being nancially constrained
depends on the ownership status of the rms. In a similar fashion, [7] Canton et
al. (2010) use the Eurobarometer data covering 25 European countries to estimate
a binary logistic model to get insights about the determinants of perceived nancing
constraints. Their ndings show that nancing constraints3 depends on rms age
while ownership structures do not seem to have a systematical e¤ect.
Regarding to the second element of our approach - rm size - there are several
papers treating it as an endogenous or exogenous variable of rms performance. A
rst insight on the theme is found in the survey collected by [5] Bernardt & Muller
(2000) about the determinants of rm size. They classify the basic determinants of
rm size within two groups: one at the rm level (i.e. economies of scale, transac-
tion costs, agency costs), and the other at the sectoral level (i.e. external economies
of scale, network externalities); and also, they identify what they call trends and
structural changes in rm size. This last item would consider the economic environ-
ment constraints or external factors, in our denition: rms constraints. Also, an
extensive analysis is found in [22] Kumar et al. (1999), where, from a 15 European
countries sample, the authors identify some industrial and country characteristics
that a¤ect the rm size possitively, namely: market size, capital intensive industries,
high wage industries, industries that do a lot of R&D, industries that require little
external nancing, e¢ cient judicial systems, better nancial markets. Some other
times research is focussed on the rms size as exogenous variable; for example, [23]
Pagano and Schivardi (2003), from a dataset of eight European countries, found that
larger size of rms fosters productivity growth because it allows rms to take advan-
tage of all the increasing returns associated with R&D. They support the view that
rm size has a causal positive impact on growth.
Until now, we implicitly suggested that rms size and rms constraints could
be likely independent variables, nevertheless there are evidence to suspect about
this apparent non-relationship. The empirical literature recognizes explicitly the
interdependence between rms size and rms constraints. In this way, [21] Kumar
and Francisco (2005), in a study made for Brazil (using the Investment Climate
3The dependent variable takes value 1 if the answer to:Would you say that today, access to loans
granted by banks is very easy, fairly easy, fairly di¢ cult or very di¢ cult? is either very di¢ cult
or fairly di¢ cultand takes value 0 if the answer is either very easyor fairly easy.
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Assesment Survey) found that rm size strongly a¤ects access to credit, and that
this e¤ect would be greater for longer-term loans. Also they suggest that public
nancial institutions are more likely to lend to large rms. In their study, they
estimate a probit model and a two step maximum likelihood probit with sample
selection, both for the probability of having a loan.
The results of [21] Kumar and Francisco (2005) are also supported by those of
[20] Kounouwewa and Chao (2011). In their article, based in information from the
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) for 16 African countries, they nd that
rms size and ownership structure are usefulness classications to explain nancing
constraints. Besides, they show that institutional development is the most impor-
tant country characteristic explaining cross-country variation in rms nancing ob-
stacles. Their methodological and empirical approach is supported by an ordered
probit regression for the response to the question: How problematic is nancing for
the operation and growth of your business? (which can take one of four options:
no obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate obstacle and major obstacle). The authors
include, as explanatory variable, the size of the rm by including two dummy vari-
ables for medium size and large size rms. In the same scope, [4] Beck et al. (2005),
using a database covering 54 countries from WBES, nd that nancial, legal, and
corruption constraints depend on rm size, and smallest rms are most constrained.
Also, there are studies that suggest a reverse causality, from rms constraints to
rms size. For instance, [1] Angelini and Generale (2005), from a survey dataset of
Italian rms and the WBES, found some interesting stylized facts: there is a negative
relationship between nancial constraints and rms size, and; this relationship is
stronger in developing countries. [11] Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006), also for Italy, look
for an answer to an almost identical question: Do liquidity constraints matter in
explaining rm size and growth? Some of their ndings, based in panel data for the
manufacture sector, are: liquidity constraints have a negative e¤ect on growth, ii)
small rms grow more, even after controlling for liquidity constraints.
Finally, we can mention two theoretical approaches that make an e¤ort to ex-
plain the potential e¤ects of nancial constraints over the rms size: [9] Cooley
and Quadrini (2001), and [6] Cabral and Mata (2003) suggest that nancing con-
straints could explain the rm size distribution and evolution over the time. The
rst document, using a model with rm heterogeneity in which long-lived rms solve
a dynamic intertemporal optimization problem, concludes that nancial factors are
crucial in di¤erentiating the production and investment decisions of rms of di¤er-
ent size and this generates dynamics of entry, exit and growth. The second paper
constructs a two-period model of a competitive industry. In the rst period rms
face nancial constraints while in the second period the rm is no longer subject to
nancing constraint. The authors calibrate the model for Portuguese manufacturing
rms, and show that this model does a good job explaining the evolution of rm size
distribution.
So far, we have revised evidence that supports the links between rms size and
rms constraints with the performance and enterprise decisions. From this section it
is clear that we should be aware to consider a potential endogeneity between the rms
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constraints and the rms size when trying to evaluate if rms perceived constraints
depend on rmssize. Our contribution aims to take this issue into account.
Nevertheless, our research objective also aims to verify which are the most bind-
ing constraints for Bolivian enterprises. A theoretical framework to identify the most
important obstacles for economies and entrepreneurs is found in [14]Hausmann et al.
(2005). In fact, they propose that scarce growth is primarily due to low levels of pri-
vate investment and entrepreneurship. Then, based on a simple theoretical model,
they divide the factors a¤ecting growth into two categories: High Cost of Financing,
and Low Return to domestic investment. In turn, these two categories can be as-
sociated with more subfactors that could be explaining low growth (see subsection
4.1). One of the main conclusions of that paper is that policymakers should be con-
cerned about the most binding constraints because governments face administrative
and political limitations, so their strategies require a sense of priorities.
In an applied fashion, and following closely the [14]Haussman et al. approach,
[10]Dinh et al. (2010) identify the most binding constraints on rms operations in
developing countries. They use the World Bank Enterprise Survey between 2006-
2010 and nd that access to nance is among the most binding constraint, specially
for small rms, which could play a signicant part in explaining why small rms do
not grow into medium and large rms. Empirically, they estimate three econometric
models for explaining the employment growth of rms. Under their denition, the
most binding constraint would be that which explains heavily the growth of rms,
with a negative sign.
A similar exercise is found in [3]Aterido et al. (2009). Using the World Bank
Enterprise Surveys between 2000-2006 for 90 countries, the authors seek to iden-
tify which rms characteristics are relevant to explain investment climate conditions
focusing on 4 areas: access to nance, business regulations, corruption, and in-
frastructure. After that, they run multiple regression models to estimate the impact
of investment climate conditions on rms employment growth. Their main objective
is to assess whether there are heterogeneous e¤ects of unlocking business enviroment
constraints. As we will see in section 4, our approach is very similar in the sense we
try to verify if rms characteristics (specially rm size) could rise the likelihood of
facing more obstacles.
According to the framework of most of the papers considered in our review, next
section introduces an empirical approach to understand and suggest evidence about
bolivian rms and their constraints.
3 Some Stylized Facts for Bolivia
This section briey analyzes main characteristics of rm size, and rmsconstraints
in Bolivia. The questionnaire of the World Bank Enterprise Survey 2010 for Bolivia
includes 16 potential issues that could be representing obstacles for the functioning
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of the rms4, also it classies rms in four categories: i) less than 5 workers, ii) small
(between 5 and 19 workers), iii) medium (between 20 and 99 workers), and iv) large
(more than 100 workers). Enterprise Survey Project collects information for several
countries around the world. Table 1 compares Bolivian rmsstructure, according
to their rm size, with respect to some other regional countries. Results between
countries are somewhat diverging, however they show a pyramid structure for some
countries: Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay, with a lot proportion of small
rms in the pyramid´s base and a small share of large rms in the pyramid´s peak.
On the other hand, Chile and Mexico show a rm size structure which depends more
heavily in medium and large rms.
Figure 1. Distribution of Firms by Firm Size
Regarding rms constraints, Figure 2 compares the share of rms identifying
each obstacle as the worst for its functioning. It reveals that between the six re-
gional countries included in the analysis, Bolivia has the worst perception about
Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sectorand Political Instability. If we
take into account only the three worst obstacles for each country, we can nd some
common issues: Competitors Practices in the Informal Sector represents a prob-
lem in 4 countries, Mexico(16%), Peru (29%), Uruguay (23%), and Bolivia (37%);
Inadequately Educated Workforceare perceived as a problem in Chile(22%), Perú
(13%), Uruguay (12%), and Bolivia (12%); Tax Ratesare considered an important
obstacle in Uruguay (24%), Argentina (20%), and Mexico (14%), and nally; Access
to Financingrepresent a constraint for the rms in Argentina (15%), Chile (12%),
and Mexico (12%).
4Each one of these potential obstacles reports a perceived classication from rms in one of
ve options: No Obstacle, Minor Obstacle, Moderate Obstacle, Major Obstacle, and Very Severe
Obstacle.
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Figure 2. Business Environment Constraints for Firms in Selected Countries (%
of rms)
Figure 3 shows the share of Bolivian rms that consider each element as a major
or very severe obstacle. From this graphic, it is easy to identify the most conictive
elements: Corruption, Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sector, Political
Instability, and Crime Theft and Disorder, in that order. In the other hand, it is
possible to notice those elements that represent fewer problems to the rms: Tax
Administration, Tax Rates, Business Licensing and Permits, and Access to Land.
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Figure 3. Proportion of Firms that Identify the Issue as a Major or Very Severe Obstacle
Now, our principal objective is far from only identify the main constraints that
rms face, in fact we try to verify if each particular obstacle a¤ects to the rms
with distinct intensity according to the rm size. Our database contains a sample of
126 small and very small rms, 149 medium rms and 87 large rms. Initially, it is
natural to believe that behavior between groups is not homogeneous, nevertheless,
Table 1 suggests that the biggest problems are not common to all the rms taking
into account the rms size. In fact, only 2 of the top 5 rank of biggest obstacles
are common between distinct rms size: Practices of Competitors in the Informal
Sector, and Inadequately Educated Workforce.
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Practices Of Competitors In The Informal Sector 41.70%
Inadequately Educated Workforce 13.20%




Practices Of Competitors In The Informal Sector 25.8%
Inadequately Educated Workforce 14.0%
Access To Financing 11.3%
Electricity 8.9%
Practices Of Competitors In The Informal Sector 59.1%
Political Instability 15.6%
Customs And Trade Regulation 8.6%
Labor Regulations 5.4%
Inadequately Educated Workforce 5.0%
Very Small and Small Firms
Medium Firms
Large Firms
Proportion of Firms That First Ranked this Obstacle as the
Biggest Problem for the Establishment
Table 1. Proportion of Firms That First Ranked this
Obstacle as the Biggest Problem for the Establishment
In order to get a second attempt about rm size-rms constraints relationship,
we calculated the proportion of small, medium, and large rms that answered that
the obstacle k (with k = 1; ::; 16) represents: i) no obstacle, ii) minor obstacle, iii)
moderate obstacle, iv) major obstacle, and v) a very severe obstacle. In the next
gures, each proportion is presented graphically5.
5The proportions data including condence intervals for the options: i) no obstacle, and ii) a
major or very severe obstacle, is reported in A Appendix.
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Figure 4. Level of Obstacle to the functioning of the establishment (Proportions)
Figure 4 shows that there are some visible trends in the rmsbehavior according
to their size. For example, Figure 3 reveals that small rms are likely to believe that
Crime, Theft and Disorderis considered such as an extreme situation, it represents
none obstacle for 19% of small rms, and it represents a major or severe obstacle for
57% of small rms. On the other hand, large rms are likely to believe that Crime,
Theft and Disorderis more likely a moderate obstacle (6% believe it represents none
obstacle, while 26% believe it represents a major or severe obstacle).
In some cases, the condence interval of each proportion easily permits us to
make inference about the signicance of di¤erences between rm sizes. Figure 4
(second graph of rst column) is a good example to infer that the proportion of
small rms that perceived Customs and Trade Regulationsas none obstacle (43%),
is statistically di¤erent (at a condence interval of 99%) from the same proportion
(statistic) for large rms (19%). This trend is conrmed with the analysis of the
same gure where we may expect that the proportion of small rms that perceived
Customs and Trade Regulationsas a Major or Severe Obstacle (17%) is statistically
distinct from the same proportion for large rms (50%). In fact, this visual analysis
may be conrmed with a Wald Test over the coe¢ cients.
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Figure 5. Level of Obstacle to the functioning of the establishment (Proportions)
Figure 5 let us continue the analysis. For example, the second graph in rst
column shows that 9% of small rms, 13% of medium rms, and 3% of large rms
perceive Political Instabilityas no issue for the functioning of the rm; while 45%
of small rms, 53% of medium rms, and 53% of large rms identify Political Insta-
bilityas a Major or Very Severe Obstacle. Thus, Figure 5 conrms that Political
Instability is a major obstacle for all kind of rms.
Finally, some obstacles are di¢ cult to interpret visually. For example in Figure 5,
Access to Financingseems to represent none obstacle for about 23-30% of rms (no
matter its size), while it represents a major or severe obstacle for almost one third
of the rms (no matter its size either). In this case, it does not seem to be statistical
di¤erences between rms sizes. Nevertheless, this rst insight with the data will be
formalized with some more appropiate instruments of analysis (section 4).
The main ndings of this section are: Bolivian rms di¤er from those of another
regional countries because they seem to face more trouble concerning Competitors
in the Informal Sectorand Political Instability. Besides, when asking to identify
the level of constraint for each potential obstacle, 60% of Bolivian rms coincide that
Corruptionis a major or very severe issue. We should expect that thse three ma-
jor constraints could be an important part of our results about binding constraints.
On the other hand the descriptive analysis suggests that distinct to the other coun-
tries, Bolivian rms do not believe that tax rates are a major constraint for their
functioning.
Other relevant ndings - when distinguishing rm sizes - reveal that rms, ac-
cording to the number of employees, do not perceive the same level of obstacles.
For example results suggest that large rms face higher probabilities for considering
Tax Ratesas no obstacle, while Political Instabilitycould be more harmful for
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large rms respect to small rms. This kind of relations permit us to expect dif-
ferences between distinct rms sizes perceptions. Evidently, the bivariate analysis
of this section excludes interactions with some other relevant variables, such as the
productive sector the rm belongs to. The empirical strategy that we describe below
is intended to overcome this concern, and give a more accurate response to the rms
size dependence, and - at the same time - provide a more accurate denition for
binding constraints.
4 The Empirical Strategy
Our research objectiveis to nd supporting evidence about: i) whether r size mat-
ters when evaluating rms constraints, and ii) most binding constraints for Bolivian
rms. We consider the following potential obstacles: Infrastructure and Services;
Transport; Informal Sector Practices; Access to Land; Crime; Access to Finance;
Government Relations (Tax rates; Tax administration; Business Licensing and Per-
mits; Political Instability; Corruption; Courts); Labor Regulations. In the next
subsections we describe the data used and the theoretical methods to be employed.
4.1 A Framework about Binding Constraints
As stated above, we support our concern for identifying binding constraints on the
HRV approach. It brings a theoretical framework for explaining low levels of private
investment and entrepreneurship. Basically, HRV note that growth is mainly ex-
plained by the investment behavior, in turn, investment depends on other variables
related with the economic environment. Figure 5 shows this scheme in a decision
tree. The HRV approach for growth diagnostics, argue that low levels of economic
activity can be explained by Low returns or High Cost of Finance. Then, this two
potential explanations face, in turn, an extensive set of constraints. For example,
Low Returns to Economic Activity could be due to Low Appropriability of these
returns, which could be due to Government Failures, specically High Taxes. In
Table 2 we show the correspondence between HRV growth diagnostics and our set
of potential binding constraints.
Even after recognizing that most or all of the constraints could be important,
the main scope of the HRV approach is to identify the most binding constraints,
considering them as the ones that are likely to provide the biggest bang for the reform
buck. While the HRV approach is very well dened on the growth determinants,
it gives us some degrees of freedom when evaluating the most binding constraint.
In fact, HRV applied the growth diagnostic to Brasil, El Salvador, and Costa Rica,
identifying the most binding constraint from stylized facts of every country; in this
regard, they do not propose an empirical method or quantitative tool in particular.
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Figure 6. Growth Diagnostics (Hausmann, Rodrik & Velasco, (2005))
Indeed, Bari et al. (2005) identify growth binding constraints for Pakistan in
a descriptive manner from the results of a the Pakistan Economic Survey 2001-02.
They were concerned also in rm size di¤erences, specially in the key role of small
and medium enterprises. Using modern econometrics, with panel data between 2006-
10, Dinh et al. (2010) constructed three specications to explain the rm growth
from which they dene the most biding constraint the one whose variable coe¢ cient
...is statistically signicant, has a large coe¢ cient in all estimations (models), and
has the right sign....
Our approach to identify the most binding constraint is somehow between the
above strategies. As it will be clear below, we dene the most binding constraint
to rms as those obstacles which represents the larger likelihood of facing a major





LA Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sector
LA Functioning of the Courts
LA Customs and Trade Regulations
LA Labor Regulations
LA Crime, Theft, and Disorder
LA Access to Land






LSR Inadequately Educated Workforce
HCF Access to Financing
LA stands for Low Appropriability; LSR stands for Low Social Returns; and HCF stands
for High Cost of Finance.
Table 2. Correspondence Between Factors Identied in
the HRV approach and the set of obstacles available in
the Enterprise Survey.
4.2 The Data
We use the 2010 Bolivian Enterprise Survey database published by the World Bank.
It contains 312 observations at rm level ([27] World Bank, 2007) from enterprises
located in the three major cities of Bolivia: La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.
Sample includes formal small, medium, and large rms. The ES is meant to be
representative of non-agricultural private sector bolivian economy, excluding rms
with less than 5 employees. The strata for Enterprise Surveys are rms size, business
sector, and geographic region within a country.
4.3 The Model
We would like to know whether constraints di¤er between distinct rm sizes. Ini-
tially, it is possible to specify a simple model for each obstacle. The constraint level
vector will be some latent variable (Y 1 ) which depends linearly on some matrix of
explanatory variables (X1) and a vector representing the unobservable rm size (Y 2 ):







Where e1 is a vector of independent and identically distributed random variables
and  is the vector of coe¢ cients to be estimated. As we count on a discrete measure
of perceived constraints we assume that each observed perception (y1;i) for any rm
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according to the following rule:
y1;i =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if y1:i  1
1 if 1 < y

1:i  2
2 if 2 < y

1:i  3
3 if 3 < y

1:i  4




To verify whether rm size (Y2)6- after controlling by a set of regressors (X1)
- determines the constraint level (Y1)7, we may solve the following log-likelihood
function maximization problem (namely, an ordered probit). The transformation
depends on the non continuous form of the observed variable (Y1) according to the
Limited Dependent Variable (LDV) literature.





log (Pr (y1;i = jjx1;i; y2;i; ; ))  1 (y1;i = j) (3)
where j can take the values: 0=No Obstacle, 1= Minor Obstacle, 2= Moderate
Obstacle, 3= Major Obstacle, 4= Very Severe Obstacle. N is the number of ob-
servations. The vector X1 may consider variables that characterize rms and are
intuitively exogenous like the legal status of the rm, the rms industry or the years
of experience of the top manager. The vectors  and  will contain the coe¢ cients
and endogenous cut points to be estimated, respectively.
Actually, equation (3) estimation would obtain consistent estimates if we could
assure that observed rm size (Y2)8 is not a result of rms constraints (i.e. rm size
is not caused by rms constraints). Then, if we do not nd evidence to consider the
rms size as an endogenous regressor, we may estimate equation (3) directly.
If we nd evidence to consider the rms size as an endogenous regressor 9 we
could estimate an IV-ordered probit model with an ordinal endogenous regressor (for
Y1). It means that equation (3) and equation (4) should be estimated jointly:





log (Pr (y2;i = hjx1;i; x2;i; ; ))  1 (y2;i = h) (4)
where, h can take the next values: 0 = very small and small enterprise, 1=
medium enterprise, and 2= large enterprise. X2 should consider variables that are
6The latent variable Y 2 has a correspondence with Y2 according to a decision rule similar to that
of equation (2).
7Where the constraint level may be any of the 16 obstacles we described above.
8Note that y2;i; equivalently to y1;i; is the observed rm size for the observation i.
9As [19] Kawatsu and Largey (2009) note, one proof of the endogeneity of the Y2 variable is found
testing the signicance of the covariance of the errors from equations (3) and (4). Or equivalently,
testing the signicance of the reported athrho statistic (which measures the Fisher´s Z Tranformation
of the correlation between error from both models).
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correlated with the rm size but are independent of the obstacle analyzed Y1, like
the formal/informal status of the rm when it began operations or the number of
employees of the rm when it started operations. Analogously to equation (3),
the vectors  and  will contain the coe¢ cients and cut points to be estimated,
respectively.
Our set of control variables (X1) includes: production sector, city, rm´s current
legal status, percent of the rm does the largest shareholder own, principal owner
gender, origin of the investment nancing needed to start the stablishment, years of
experience of the top manager, international-recognized quality certication status,
and annual growth of labor (as a proxy to rms performance).
On the other hand, our potential instruments, or excluded variables (X2) for the
rm size (Y2) are: i) the stablishment belongs to a larger rm, ii) the number of
full time employees when the stablishment started operations, iii) the legal status
of the rm when it started operations, iv) the age of the rm (number of years
from rm creation). The excluded variables must be correlated with rm size but
independent of rmsconstraints perception; we believe the set we chose accomplish
it. In general, if rms belongs to a larger rm should be quite independent of obstacle
perception, and correlated with rm size. The other mentioned instruments follow
the past information rationale which means that all of them were determined in the
past, while obstacle perception is determined under current conditions. Then, while
initial number of employees, initial legal status, and age of rms are related to the
current rm size, they are not rationally correlated with current constraints of rms.
The IV ordered probit model with an ordinal endogenous regressor, represented
above by equations (3) and (4), can be estimated considering a system of equations
nested by the Conditional (Recursive) Mixed-Process Model (CMP). CMP is appro-
priate for two types of models: 1) those in which a truly recursive data-generating
process is posited; and 2) those in which there is simultaneity, but instruments al-
low the construction of a recursive set of equations (as in two-stage least squares)
that can be used to consistently estimate structural parameters in the nal stage.
This kind of model embrace probit, iv-probit, biprobit, ordered probit, multinomial
probit, and seemingly unrelated regression to name a few (see [25] Roodman, 2009).
The CMP procedure calculate its estimators from a maximum likelihood approach
over a multivariate normal distribution. In this way, with this novel procedure, we
are capable to take into account the potential endogeneity of a right-hand variable
that is not continuous but dichotomous or polycothomous. In the next section we
present the results of the model described above.
5 Results
Our strategy starts estimating the system composed by equations (3) and (4) [IV-
oprobit model] for each one of the 16 obstacles included in the database. If we fail
to reject the exogeneity test (H0 : athrho = 0) then the estimators of the single
equation (3) [Oprobit model] should be consistent, otherwise the valid estimators
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are those from the rst equation of the two-equation system [IV-oprobit model] 10.
However, we report both alternatives with their full results in the appendix. In
all estimations we include control variables: i) geographic variables for each city
where the survey was taken, ii) the industry where the rm belongs, iii) the legal
status and ownership structure of the rm, iv) characteristics of the rm (principal
gender owner, years of experience of top manager, Internationally-recognized quality
certication), and v) the performance of the rm (annual labor growth in the last
three years). Then, we report marginal e¤ects and conditional probabilities, which
permit us to accomplish the two main objectives of the paper: verify if obstacles are
di¤erent for disctinct rm size, and identify the most biding constraints. Therefore
we divide this section according to those two objectives:
5.1 Firms Constraints: Does Firm Size Matters?
In Table 3 we resume the model selection process, and the main results about the
e¤ect of rm size11:
ACCESS TO FINANCING YES YES
ACCESS TO LAND NO NO
BUSINESS LICENSING AND PERMITS YES YES
CORRUPTION NO NO
CRIME THEFT AND DISORDER NO NO
CUSTOMS AND TRADE REGULATION NO NO
ELECTRICITY YES YES
FUNCTIONING OF THE COURTS/COURTS NO YES
INADEQUATELY EDUCATED WORKFORCE NO NO
LABOR REGULATIONS NO NO
POLITICAL INSTABILITY NO NO
PRACTICES OF COMPETITORS IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR YES YES
TAX ADMINISTRATION NO YES






Table 3. Model Selection Resume
10There is not a known method to calculate the overidentication test for this kind of models.
Therefore, only for reference purposes, we report this test, and the underidentication test for
the same specications reported using an instrumental variables ML estimator for an endogenous
continous structural variable (Y1) and an endogenous continous regressor (Y2). See appendix.
11We assume that size matters when at least one of the associated coe¢ cients to rm size were
(statistically) signicant at 5%.
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The results in Table 3 show that 9 from 16 obstacles are perceived with di¤erent
intensity depending on the rm size (i.e. size matters). Besides, there seems to be
evidence of a potential endogenity issue in 6 cases. Moreover, Table 4 shows the
conditional probability of occurrence for each event by each potential obstacle. The
top 4 probabilities for each event (No Obstacle [0], Minor Obstacle [1], Moderate
Obstacle [2], Major Obstacle [3], and Very Severe Obstacle [4]) are reported in bold
letters. For example, the probability that an average rm considers electricity as a
very severe obstacle for its functioning is 25.5%, while the probability, for a repre-
sentative rm, of access to landrepresenting no obstacle is 44.5%. Evidently, Table
4 allows us to identify which obstacles we should care about, and which ones are not
so problematic. The model results show that Electricity, Practices of Competitors
in the Informal Sector, Transportation, and Corruptionare the most likely very
severe obstacles to rms, while Access to land, Customs and Trade Regulations,
Telecommunications, and Access to Financing, may be considered such as minor
issues since they expect a large likelihood of representing no obstacle to rms.
Pr (Y1=0) Pr (Y1=1) Pr (Y1=2) Pr (Y1=3) Pr (Y1=4)
ELECTRICITY 0.221 0.255 0.126 0.123 0.275
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 0.296 0.150 0.227 0.174 0.153
TRANSPORTATION 0.206 0.215 0.279 0.125 0.175
CUSTOMS AND TRADE REGULATION 0.334 0.161 0.359 0.129 0.018
PRACTICES OF COMPETITORS IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 0.075 0.071 0.375 0.283 0.196
ACCESS TO LAND 0.445 0.195 0.245 0.109 0.006
FUNCTIONING OF THE COURTS/COURTS 0.227 0.176 0.272 0.267 0.058
CRIME THEFT AND DISORDER 0.118 0.177 0.248 0.309 0.148
TAX RATES 0.203 0.233 0.496 0.047 0.020
TAX ADMINISTRATION 0.200 0.230 0.529 0.027 0.014
BUSINESS LICENSING AND PERMITS 0.172 0.368 0.378 0.074 0.008
POLITICAL INSTABILITY 0.071 0.178 0.264 0.366 0.121
CORRUPTION 0.086 0.130 0.162 0.464 0.158
ACCESS TO FINANCING 0.260 0.100 0.375 0.220 0.045
LABOR REGULATIONS 0.043 0.224 0.477 0.218 0.038
INADEQUATELY EDUCATED WORKFORCE 0.040 0.203 0.431 0.249 0.077
Table 4. Model Results: Predicted Probability for a Representative Firm.
However, the results presented so far do not take into account di¤erences by rm
size. The next graphs show the distinct results between di¤erent rm sizes in an
illustrative manner. In the following - based on results from the correctmodel - we
just concentrate on those obstacles where size matters (see Table 3 for the detail).
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Figure 7. Electricity: Marginal E¤ects (for discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1)
Figure 6 shows that being a medium or large rm, increases the probability that
Electricity represents a very severe obstacle; the marginal e¤ect for a large rm
is 0.64, while for medium rms is 0.39. In a consistent manner, being a medium
or large rm decreases the probability that Electricity represents no obstacle for
rms; marginal e¤ect for a large rm is -0.27, and -0.30 for medium rms. In Figure
7 is possible to nd the predicted probability calculated at the mean value of the
explicative variables. The model predicts that - for a representative rm - there is a
22.1% likelihood for considering Electricitysuch as no obstacle for its functioning;
on the other hand, a representative rm will have a 27.5% probability of considering
Electricityas a very severe obstacle. These results suggest that provision of public
infrastructure, like Electricity, is an important concern for all rms, but specially
relevant for medium and large rms.
Figure 8. Telecommunications: Marginal E¤ects (for discrete
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1)
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Results on Electricityresemble those of Telecommunications. Figure 8 shows
some similarities. The likelihood that Telecommunicationsrepresents a very severe
obstacle is 15.3% but it increases when we refer to medium or large rms. Moreover,
the probability that Telecommunicationsrepresents no obstacle for rms (29.6%)
decreases when we refer to medium and large rms. These results reinforce that
provision of public infrastructure, like Telecommunications, is an important concern
for all rms, but specially relevant for medium and large rms. Another interesting
fact: the probability that Electricityrepresents a major or very severe obstacle is
about 40%, while the same probability for Telecommunicationsobstacle is about
33%, then public policy may focus on both obstacles specially on medium and large
rms.
Figure 9. Transportation: Marginal E¤ects (for discrete change
of dummy variable from 0 to 1)
When analyzing Transportationas an obstacle, results shown in Figure 9 sug-
gests that rm size matters, and according to marginal e¤ects, it seems Transporta-
tionwill represent more trouble for medium and large rms. It seems logic if we
consider that small rms are not intended to depend on transportation systems as
much as large rms (which could be exporters or importers). In any case, the prob-
ability of representing a major or very severe obstacle, is slightly smaller than in the
rst two obstacles analyzed (30%).
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Figure 10. Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sector:
Marginal E¤ects (for discrete change of dummy variable from 0
to 1)
Results concerning Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sector are more
revealing. First, it is clear that the probability that it represents no obstacle is small
(7.5%), while the probability that it represents a major or very severe obstacle is high
(48%!). We also notice that the likelihood of facing a very severe obstacle increases
when we are talking about a large rm. These results conrm what we saw in section
3: informality represents the most important obstacle for rms in Bolivia. Even if
large rms face more issues because of the existence of informal markets, the model
demonstrate that it is a generalized problem.
Figure 11. Courts: Marginal E¤ects (for discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1)
Following the same logic, the likelihood that Functioning of Courtswould be a
major or very severe obstacle to rms is 33%. The results of Figure 11 suggest that
it could be a bigger problem for large rms, as a matter of fact a large rm increases
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the likelihood that Functioning of Courtsrepresents a major obstacle (in 0.15 pp),
while it decreases its likelihood of representing none obstacle (in 0.17 pp).
Figure 12. Tax Rates: Marginal E¤ects (for discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1)
Figure 13. Tax Administration: Marginal E¤ects (for discrete
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1)
While the obstacles described in gures 7-11 were relatively important for all
rms, Figure 12 and Figure 13 show two obstacles which probably would not be
considered as binding constraints, even though rm size matters when explaining
them. Tax Ratesand Tax Administrationhave minor probabilities asociated to
consider them as major or very severe obstacles, in fact, those probabilities are 6.7%
and 4.1% respectively. The results also suggest that being a large or medium rm
increases the likelihood for considering Tax Ratesas no obstacle.
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Figure 14. Business Licensing and Permits: Marginal E¤ects
(for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1)
On the other hand, according to Figure 14, Business Licensing and Permitsrep-
resents a moderate concern for rms. It reects on the 7.5% probability of represent-
ing a major or very severe obstacle for the functioning of rms. Also, it is interesting
that being a large or medium rm decreases the likelihood of facing a major problem,
while increases the likelihood of facing no obstacle, then being a large or medium
rm is good to expect Business Licensing and Permitsas no obstacle. This result
seems natural as Business Licensing and Permits could be considered a starting
business activity, which should be associated strongly to small rms.
Figure 15. Access to Financing: Marginal E¤ects (for discrete
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1)
Finally, the results from Figure 15 are very similar to those from Figure 14.
Access to Financingdoes not seem to represent a very severe obstacle (its likelihood
is 4.5%), but there is a reasonable likelihood to represent a major problem (22%).
Moreover, there is some evidence to distinguish a quantitative di¤erence between
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distinct rm sizes, in fact, medium and large rms would expect to face no obstacle
with a larger likelihood than small rms. It is conrmed by noting that medium and
large rms are less likely to face a major obstacle on the Access to Finance.
5.2 Binding Constraints
Finally, based on our calculations, we constructed two distinct measures to rank the
worst obstacles (or most binding constraints) faced by each rm according to its
size12.
 In the rst one, we report the conditional probability (predicted by our models)
for expecting a major or very severe obstacle by obstacle and rm size.
 The second approach is a relative measure. We use a pivot category : small rm
size. So, for medium and large rms: we calculate the sum of marginal e¤ects
of facing a major or very severe obstacle when becoming a medium or large
rm with respect to the base scenario (small rm). The higher is this sum, the
worst is the obstacle. For small rms: we calculate the sum of marginal e¤ects
of facing a major or very severe obstacle from medium and large rms. The
smaller is this sum, the worst is the obstacle for small rms. It is important to
be clear that this second ranking should be read as a relative measure between
rm size denitions.
Table 5 (and Figures 16 and 17) show the results from our rst approach. We
report the conditional probability predicted by the models for expecting a major
or very severe obstacle in each issue. The ranking conrms that Corruption, Infor-
mality and Political Instability seem to be common obstacles to all rms. Also, it
is possible to notice that public services provision would be a problem for medium
and large rms (mainly Electricityand Transportation). Another fact worthwhile
mentioning is that Access to Financingwould be an important obstacle only for
small rms (the likelihood of representing a major or very severe obstacle is 33% for
small rms, 15% for medium rms, and just 7% for large rms).
12 In the rst one, we report the conditional probability (predicted by our models) for expecting a
major or very severe obstacle for each obstacle and by rm size.
The second approach is a relative measure. For medium and large rms: we calculate the sum of
marginal e¤ects of facing a major or very severe obstacle when becoming a medium or large rm,
respect to the base scenario (small rm). The higher is this e¤ect, the worst is the obstacle.
For small rms: we calculate the sum of marginal e¤ects of facing a major or very severe obstacle
from medium and large rms. The smaller is this e¤ect, the worst is the obstacle for small rms. It




Crime, Theft, and Disorder 0.54
Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sector 0.51
Political Instability 0.45
Access to Financing 0.33
Inadequately Educated Workforce 0.31
Electricity 0.29
Telecommunications 0.25
Functioning of the Courts 0.24
Labor Regulations 0.18
Transportation 0.17
Customs and Trade Regulations 0.12
Access to Land 0.12







Functioning of the Courts 0.39
Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sector 0.39
Telecommunications 0.37
Crime, Theft, and Disorder 0.35
Inadequately Educated Workforce 0.21
Labor Regulations 0.19
Access to Financing 0.15
Customs and Trade Regulations 0.10
Access to Land 0.09
Tax Rates 0.03




Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sector 0.64
Functioning of the Courts 0.52
Transportation 0.52
Electricity 0.49
Crime, Theft, and Disorder 0.44
Labor Regulations 0.34
Telecommunications 0.29
Inadequately Educated Workforce 0.27
Customs and Trade Regulations 0.25
Access to Land 0.18
Access to Financing 0.07
Tax Administration 0.02
Tax Rates 0.01
Business Licensing and Permits 0.00
Large
Medium
Very Small + Small Firms
Table 5. Ranking of Conditional probabilities for
expecting a major or very severe obstacle (by rm
size).
Figures 16 and 17 show the conditional probabilities for four types of rms:
Average, Small, Medium, and Large. Average stands for the representative rm size
in Bolivia (it is a weighted average of small, medium, and large rms), while following
the denitions of the Enterprise Survey, Small rms represents rms with less than
19 workers, Medium Firms represent those rms with 20 to 99 workers, and Large
Firms those rms with more than 100 workers.
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Figure 15. Level of Obstacle to the functioning of the establishment (Conditional Probability)
Figure 16. Level of Obstacle to the functioning of the establishment (Conditional Probability)
According to our second measure for constructing a ranking, in table 6 we sum-
marize the most harmful obstacles for each rm according to its size, and with respect
to the other categories. For example, Access to Financingis the worst obstacle for
small rms. We rank our ndings according to a score, in the case of Access to
Financingthe score is -0.57, and it is just the sum of marginal e¤ects implied for
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facing a major or very severe obstacle by being a medium (-0.28) or large rm (-0.27).
It means that being a medium rm (respect to small rms) will reduce the likelihood
of facing a major or very severe obstacle in 0.28, and being a large rm (respect to
small rms) will reduce the likelihood of facing a major or very severe obstacle in
0.27, then, small rms are in a worse position than medium and large ones.
Access to Financing -0.57













Worst Obstacles by Firm Size
Table 6. Ranking of Relative Worst Obstacles by Firm Size
The medium and large rms ranking is even easier to calculate. The score as-
sociated to Transportation(0.46), is just the sum of marginal e¤ects from being a
medium rm (with respect to small rms) when facing a major or very severe ob-
stacle. In this case, being a medium rm increases the likelihood of facing a major
obstacle in 0.09, and increases the likelihood of facing a very severe obstacle in 0.37.
It is worth noting that, small rms seem to face more issues with starting business
categories,and are more sensitive to scal policy (tax rates and tax administration).
On the other hand, medium and large rms face more issues with infrastructure
variables (transportation, electricity and telecommunications), and large rms should
care more about Practices of competitors in the informal sector.
These relative results do not imply that public policy should be oriented with
special consideration to Table 6 obstacles, indeed public policy should take into
account that Practices of Competitors in the Informal Sector, Political Instability,
and Corruption are generalized problems, considering - at the same time - that
some obstacles imply deeper di¤erences between distinct rm sizes.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we attempt to generate evidence on two issues: Do constraints faced by
rms have varying intensities according to the characteristics of rms?, and which
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are the most binding constraints to rms in Bolivia?
Using the World Bank Enterprise Survey 2010 for Bolivia, we constructed the
unconditional and conditional likelihood for being constrained considering three types
of rm size. Besides, we claim that a potential indogeneity issue between rms
constraints and rm size should be considered when doing the calculations.
Our results distinguish two sets of binding constraints: i) those that are common
to all kind of rms, and ii) those which a¤ect more strongly a subset of rms according
to their size. Regarding to the rst set, our estimations show that Bolivian rms face
common biding constraints: Corruption, Political Instability, and Crime, Theft
and Disorder; there is no evidence of rm size e¤ect related with those constraints.
However, on the other hand there is a subset of binding constraints whose e¤ect
are distinct between di¤erent rm sizes: Practices of Competitors in the Informal
Sector, Access to Financing, Electricity, Transportation, and Functioning of
Courts. For example, our results suggest that large rms are more sensitive to
Informal Sector activities than medium and small rms. We predict that - for a rep-
resentative rm - there is a 47.1% likelihood for considering Practices of Competitors
in the Informal Sectoras a major or very severe obstacle for its functioning, while
a large rm will have a 64% probability of considering Practices of Competitors in
the Informal Sectoras a major or very severe obstacle.
Something similar occurs with Electricity, Transportation, and Functioning of
Courts, which seem to inuence stronger and negatively to large and medium rms.
On the other hand, Access to Financingis suggested as a binding constraint only
for small rms.
Under the HRV approach, we suggest that obstacles associated with Low Appro-
priability would be common to all rms; obstacles associated to Low Social Returns
(specially Bad Infrastructure problems) would be constraining medium and large
rms; and binding constraints associated to High Cost of Finance would be a¤ecting
small rms performance.
Our ndings are important because they can be directly extrapolated to public
policy that is focused on the performance of rms. Our identication of binding
constraints should allow a better resource allocation.
Finally, while the methodology proposed was applied with particular emphasis
on rm size di¤erences, there is no reason to avoid the analysis on rmsownership
structure or rmsindustry. We left this as an extension of this paper.
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Proportion of Small, Medium and Large Firms that Identify None, and Major or








None 0.313 0.207 0.41 0.282
[0.170,0.503] [0.102,0.376] [0.149,0.733] [0.184,0.406]
Major or very severe 0.375 0.368 0.421 0.376
[0.221,0.559] [0.204,0.569] [0.193,0.688] [0.266,0.501]
N 362








None 0.371 0.247 0.443 0.33
[0.216,0.559] [0.116,0.449] [0.177,0.746] [0.222,0.460]
Major or very severe 0.32 0.36 0.259 0.329
[0.184,0.494] [0.204,0.552] [0.113,0.490] [0.230,0.447]
N 360








None 0.284 0.169 0.0626 0.219
[0.146,0.479] [0.061,0.387] [0.025,0.149] [0.128,0.348]
Major or very severe 0.279 0.343 0.268 0.302
[0.153,0.452] [0.190,0.539] [0.120,0.496] [0.207,0.419]
N 356








None 0.44 0.331 0.181 0.374
[0.273,0.622] [0.158,0.566] [0.068,0.401] [0.258,0.508]
Major or very severe 0.162 0.216 0.501 0.215
[0.080,0.301] [0.100,0.408] [0.233,0.768] [0.136,0.324]
N 342
95% confidence intervals in brackets
Level of Obstacle of TELECOMMUNICATIONS to the functioning of the
Level of Obstacle of ELECTRICITY to the functioning of the establishment
Level of Obstacle of TRANSPORTATION to the functioning of the
establishment
Level of Obstacle of CUSTOMS AND TRADE REGULATION to the









None 0.0627 0.222 0.0895 0.126
[0.013,0.256] [0.087,0.460] [0.032,0.225] [0.059,0.251]
Major or very severe 0.544 0.46 0.4 0.498
[0.363,0.714] [0.275,0.657] [0.184,0.662] [0.375,0.621]
N 352








None 0.432 0.54 0.2 0.449
[0.267,0.614] [0.345,0.724] [0.096,0.371] [0.329,0.576]
Major or very severe 0.169 0.158 0.078 0.156
[0.071,0.351] [0.064,0.342] [0.030,0.186] [0.086,0.266]
N 351








None 0.265 0.291 0.126 0.262
[0.130,0.466] [0.138,0.511] [0.053,0.271] [0.162,0.395]
Major or very severe 0.329 0.349 0.477 0.351
[0.179,0.523] [0.188,0.553] [0.198,0.770] [0.240,0.482]
N 337








None 0.191 0.103 0.0565 0.145
[0.084,0.378] [0.033,0.281] [0.024,0.129] [0.076,0.258]
Major or very severe 0.55 0.366 0.264 0.452
[0.374,0.715] [0.204,0.566] [0.106,0.520] [0.334,0.576]
N 360
95% confidence intervals in brackets
Level of Obstacle of ACCESS TO LAND to the functioning of the establishment
Level of Obstacle of PRACTICES OF COMPETITORS IN THE INFORMAL
SECTOR to the functioning of the establishment.
Level of Obstacle of FUNCTIONING OF THE COURTS to the functioning of
the establishment









None 0.112 0.402 0.501 0.261
[0.043,0.259] [0.227,0.607] [0.234,0.767] [0.167,0.385]
Major or very severe 0.089 0.17 0.103 0.122
[0.030,0.235] [0.072,0.351] [0.042,0.229] [0.066,0.214]
N 361








None 0.121 0.395 0.447 0.258
[0.050,0.265] [0.219,0.602] [0.182,0.746] [0.163,0.382]
Major or very severe 0.0339 0.164 0.0877 0.0889
[0.012,0.092] [0.067,0.347] [0.033,0.215] [0.045,0.166]
N 359








None 0.155 0.287 0.374 0.227
[0.074,0.295] [0.136,0.508] [0.119,0.725] [0.139,0.347]
Major or very severe 0.147 0.113 0.0997 0.13
[0.057,0.332] [0.054,0.221] [0.040,0.230] [0.070,0.227]
N 361








None 0.102 0.132 0.0304 0.107
[0.037,0.253] [0.044,0.334] [0.010,0.085] [0.052,0.207]
Major or very severe 0.457 0.545 0.537 0.498
[0.291,0.632] [0.348,0.729] [0.248,0.803] [0.377,0.620]
N 360
95% confidence intervals in brackets
Level of Obstacle of TAX RATES to the functioning of the establishment
Level of Obstacle of TAX ADMINISTRATION to the functioning of the
establishment
Level of Obstacle of BUSINESS LICENSING AND PERMITS to the
functioning of the establishment










None 0.166 0.109 0.142 0.142
[0.069,0.349] [0.032,0.313] [0.047,0.360] [0.074,0.253]
Major or very severe 0.59 0.579 0.688 0.595
[0.407,0.751] [0.375,0.759] [0.450,0.856] [0.469,0.711]
N 358








None 0.225 0.315 0.298 0.267
[0.110,0.408] [0.163,0.521] [0.130,0.546] [0.174,0.388]
Major or very severe 0.289 0.279 0.315 0.287
[0.151,0.481] [0.131,0.497] [0.075,0.723] [0.183,0.420]
N 351








None 0.111 0.0931 0.0368 0.0969
[0.042,0.263] [0.042,0.194] [0.014,0.091] [0.051,0.177]
Major or very severe 0.343 0.293 0.289 0.319
[0.197,0.527] [0.153,0.488] [0.131,0.522] [0.218,0.440]
N 360








None 0.0808 0.0962 0.0209 0.081
[0.023,0.249] [0.024,0.313] [0.006,0.067] [0.033,0.186]
Major or very severe 0.41 0.341 0.239 0.367
[0.252,0.590] [0.188,0.536] [0.116,0.430] [0.260,0.490]
N 358
95% confidence intervals in brackets
Level of Obstacle of CORRUPTION to the functioning of the establishment
Level of Obstacle of ACCESS TO FINANCING to the functioning of the
establishment
Level of Obstacle of LABOR REGULATIONS to the functioning of the
establishment
Level of Obstacle of INADEQUATELY EDUCATED WORKFORCE to the






Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 0.479 0.126 1.132 0.001
Size = Large >=100 0.523 0.219 1.827 0.012
Type = Manufacturing -0.850 0.04 -1.000 0.006
City = Santa Cruz -0.516 0.103 -0.678 0.006
Industry = Construction Section F -1.794 0.022 -1.827 0.006
Industry = Services of Motor Vehicles -0.570 0.342 -1.139 0.031
Industry = Wholesale -1.094 0.008 -1.021 0.005
Industry = Retail -0.697 0.092 -0.796 0.086
Industry = Transport  Section I -0.965 0.01 -1.134 0.005
Years Experience Top Manager 0.023 0.062 0.024 0.041
Internationally-recognized quality certification = No 0.707 0.045 0.882 0.005
Growth 2.457 0.058 2.210 0.077
/cut_1_1 -0.271 0.688 0.143 0.812
/cut_1_2 0.514 0.432 0.850 0.130
/cut_1_3 0.858 0.181 1.168 0.034
/cut_1_4 1.220 0.054 1.508 0.005
Athrho -0.698 0.036
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 3941.662
Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 3.903
Chi-sq(3) P-val = 0.272





Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 0.357 0.298 1.052 0.001
Size = Large >=100 0.136 0.721 1.529 0.006
Type = Manufacturing -0.715 0.025 -0.736 0.011
Type = Retail 1.409 0.000 1.033 0.012
City = La Paz -0.580 0.203 -0.686 0.080
City = Santa Cruz -0.920 0.062 -1.166 0.003
Industry = Wholesale -1.283 0.001 -0.886 0.019
Industry = Retail -1.798 0.007 -1.379 0.061
Internationally-recognized quality certification = Yes 1.033 0.038 0.863 0.076
Internationally-recognized quality certification = No 0.983 0.015 1.064 0.008
Growth 3.056 0.010 2.591 0.020
/cut_1_1 -0.260 0.693 0.079 0.896
/cut_1_2 0.200 0.756 0.497 0.397
/cut_1_3 0.894 0.168 1.121 0.063
/cut_1_4 1.518 0.015 1.688 0.004
Athrho -0.736 0.002
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 28.339
Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 3.965
Chi-sq(3) P-val = 0.265






Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 0.678 0.053 1.327 0.001
Size = Large >=100 0.991 0.002 2.173 0.000
City = Santa Cruz -0.558 0.085 -0.752 0.009
Industry = Garments -0.351 0.244 -0.569 0.053
Industry = Services of Motor Vehicles -1.333 0.065 -1.655 0.009
Legal Status = Sole (propietorship) 0.524 0.160 0.701 0.060
Internationally-recognized quality certification = Yes 1.467 0.003 1.313 0.007
Internationally-recognized quality certification = No 1.355 0.008 1.421 0.002
/cut_1_1 0.682 0.212 1.101 0.032
/cut_1_2 1.371 0.010 1.727 0.000
/cut_1_3 2.154 0.000 2.454 0.000
/cut_1_4 2.588 0.000 2.865 0.000
Athrho -0.600 0.048
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 4082.000
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 8.560
Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.073





Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.141 0.627 -0.269 0.418
Size = Large >=100 0.502 0.182 0.198 0.732
Type = Manufacturing 0.712 0.022 0.747 0.016
Type = Retail 0.777 0.022 0.800 0.014
Industry = Construction Section F 2.277 0.021 2.291 0.018
Industry = Wholesale 1.330 0.001 1.312 0.001
Industry = Transport  Section I 0.998 0.016 1.011 0.011
Internationally-recognized quality certification = Yes 2.561 0.000 2.572 0.000
Internationally-recognized quality certification = No 1.166 0.016 1.117 0.025
Growth 2.141 0.061 2.134 0.065
/cut_1_1 1.925 0.000 1.837 0.001
/cut_1_2 2.375 0.000 2.286 0.000
/cut_1_3 3.473 0.000 3.374 0.000
/cut_1_4 4.666 0.000 4.554 0.000
Athrho 0.148 0.389
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 31.379
Chi-sq(7) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 4.144
Chi-sq(6) P-val = 0.657
Underidentification Test and Overidentification Test calculated on a IV-linear model.





Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.319 0.248 0.289 0.450
Size = Large >=100 0.324 0.336 1.434 0.012
Type = Manufacturing -0.828 0.005 -0.810 0.004
City = La Paz -1.255 0.001 -1.276 0.000
City = Santa Cruz -0.964 0.006 -1.154 0.001
Industry = Garments 1.979 0.005 1.597 0.013
Industry = Chemicals 2.004 0.000 2.144 0.000
Industry = Services of Motor Vehicles -1.461 0.097 -1.756 0.024
Legal Status = Privately held, limited liability company -0.616 0.098 -0.876 0.005
Percentage held by largest owner (25-49%) 1.365 0.000 1.297 0.000
Percentage held by largest owner (50-74%) 0.675 0.020 0.620 0.017
Years Experience Top Manager -0.022 0.041 -0.019 0.071
Internationally-recognized quality certification = No 0.301 0.286 0.530 0.074
/cut_1_1 -2.951 0.000 -2.398 0.000
/cut_1_2 -2.541 0.000 -2.009 0.001
/cut_1_3 -1.336 0.002 -0.897 0.090
/cut_1_4 -0.482 0.278 -0.089 0.859
Athrho -0.533 0.052
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 3277.000
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 4.035
Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.401
Underidentification Test and Overidentification Test calculated on a IV-linear model.




Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.179 0.527 -0.236 0.494
Size = Large >=100 0.262 0.377 0.139 0.806
City = Santa Cruz -0.603 0.021 -0.584 0.031
Industry = Foods 0.997 0.027 1.027 0.030
Industry = Hotel and restaurants: section H 0.574 0.018 0.575 0.019
Industry = Transport  Section I 0.851 0.005 0.859 0.006
Percentage held by largest owner (50-74%) 0.675 0.047 0.679 0.045
Internationally-recognized quality certification = Yes 1.986 0.000 2.016 0.000
Internationally-recognized quality certification = No 1.702 0.000 1.704 0.000
/cut_1_1 1.653 0.001 1.636 0.001
/cut_1_2 2.150 0.000 2.133 0.000
/cut_1_3 2.990 0.000 2.972 0.000
/cut_1_4 4.285 0.000 4.268 0.000
Athrho 0.054 0.798
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 4195.000
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 1.108
Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.893






Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 0.427 0.209 0.708 0.120
Size = Large >=100 0.754 0.052 1.429 0.036
Type = Manufacturing -0.801 0.007 -0.873 0.003
Type = Retail -0.943 0.002 -0.972 0.002
Industry = Textiles -1.785 0.007 -1.726 0.004
Legal Status = Publicly listed company 2.895 0.000 2.895 0.000
Legal Status = Privately held, limited liability company 2.434 0.002 2.377 0.003
Legal Status = Sole (propietorship) 2.893 0.000 3.051 0.000
Legal Status = Partnership 2.393 0.002 2.454 0.001
/cut_1_1 1.380 0.069 1.611 0.045
/cut_1_2 1.884 0.015 2.103 0.010
/cut_1_3 2.584 0.001 2.785 0.001
/cut_1_4 3.702 0.000 3.877 0.000
Athrho -0.301 0.197
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 2423.000
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 4.144
Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.387





Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.479 0.086 -0.803 0.040
Size = Large >=100 -0.259 0.394 -1.069 0.186
Industry = Textiles -1.878 0.006 -1.940 0.012
Industry = Retail 0.683 0.012 0.637 0.013
Industry = Hotel and restaurants: section H 0.704 0.056 0.635 0.077
Industry = Transport  Section I 0.988 0.009 0.983 0.001
/cut_1_1 -1.244 0.000 -1.425 0.000
/cut_1_2 -0.597 0.039 -0.801 0.013
/cut_1_3 0.051 0.854 -0.172 0.607
/cut_1_4 0.988 0.001 0.734 0.068
Athrho 0.382 0.329
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 3926.000
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 3.067
Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.547
Underidentification Test and Overidentification Test calculated on a IV-linear model.





Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.602 0.034 -0.609 0.120
Size = Large >=100 -0.836 0.011 -0.852 0.100
Type = Manufacturing -0.610 0.010 -0.609 0.009
Industry = Other Manufacturing 0.858 0.000 0.855 0.000
Industry = Garments 0.906 0.058 0.908 0.067
Industry = Chemicals -0.902 0.001 -0.906 0.004
Industry = Hotel and restaurants: section H 1.155 0.001 1.155 0.001
Legal Status = Privately held, limited liability company 0.818 0.034 0.823 0.030
Percentage held by largest owner (0-24%) -2.312 0.000 -2.301 0.000
Percentage held by largest owner (50-74%) 0.594 0.022 0.594 0.022
Internationally-recognized quality certification = Yes 0.545 0.017 0.548 0.035
/cut_1_1 -0.791 0.001 -0.794 0.002
/cut_1_2 -0.121 0.562 -0.124 0.590
/cut_1_3 1.534 0.000 1.531 0.000
/cut_1_4 2.090 0.000 2.087 0.000
Athrho 0.006 0.970
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 3350.000
Chi-sq(6) P-val = 0.001
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 1.787
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.878





Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.722 0.008 -0.763 0.052
Size = Large >=100 -0.616 0.074 -0.710 0.203
Industry = Other Manufacturing 0.619 0.019 0.606 0.025
Industry = Textiles -1.760 0.003 -1.765 0.004
Industry = Hotel and restaurants: section H 1.162 0.000 1.160 0.000
Legal Status = Privately held, limited liability company 0.835 0.013 0.864 0.015
Percentage held by largest owner (0-24%) -1.679 0.004 -1.604 0.021
Percentage held by largest owner (50-74%) 0.670 0.020 0.672 0.019
Principal Owner Gender= Female / Are any of the principal owners female?-0.479 0.060 -0.483 0.061
Growth 1.925 0.092 1.903 0.098
/cut_1_1 -0.826 0.000 -0.850 0.001
/cut_1_2 -0.196 0.451 -0.219 0.472
/cut_1_3 1.774 0.000 1.750 0.000
/cut_1_4 2.287 0.000 2.260 0.000
Athrho 0.039 0.842
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 23.417
Chi-sq(6) P-val = 0.001
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 2.961
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.706






Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.792 0.002 -1.125 0.000
Size = Large >=100 -1.358 0.002 -2.245 0.000
Type = Manufacturing 0.591 0.097 0.720 0.032
Industry = Other Manufacturing 1.323 0.001 1.356 0.000
Industry = Foods 1.375 0.012 1.599 0.003
Industry = Textiles -1.309 0.037 -1.293 0.065
Industry = Plastics & rubber 1.889 0.019 2.053 0.012
Industry = Construction Section F 1.895 0.000 2.025 0.000
Industry = Services of Motor Vehicles 2.144 0.000 2.521 0.000
Industry = Wholesale 1.585 0.000 1.646 0.000
Industry = Retail 1.039 0.042 1.205 0.010
Industry = Hotel and restaurants: section H 1.966 0.000 2.052 0.000
Industry = Transport  Section I 1.864 0.000 2.047 0.000
Legal Status = Privately held, limited liability company 0.794 0.021 0.940 0.000
Principal Owner Gender= Female / Are any of the principal owners female?-0.437 0.076 -0.412 0.062
/cut_1_1 -0.133 0.671 -0.142 0.620
/cut_1_2 0.952 0.003 0.910 0.002
/cut_1_3 2.304 0.000 2.207 0.000
/cut_1_4 3.353 0.000 3.210 0.000
Athrho 0.454 0.007
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 19.774
Chi-sq(6) P-val = 0.003
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 6.840
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.233
Underidentification Test and Overidentification Test calculated on a IV-linear model.




Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 0.064 0.839 -0.398 0.323
Size = Large >=100 0.664 0.055 -0.342 0.635
Industry = Textiles -1.377 0.055 -1.321 0.098
Industry = Chemicals -1.266 0.000 -1.407 0.000
Industry = Hotel and restaurants: section H 0.455 0.095 0.475 0.080
Legal Status = Sole (propietorship) -0.710 0.061 -0.833 0.022
Percentage held by largest owner (0-24%) -1.383 0.000 -0.793 0.076
Percentage held by largest owner (75-100%) -0.904 0.005 -0.773 0.024
Principal Owner Gender= Female / Are any of the principal owners female?-0.510 0.039 -0.500 0.049
Internationally-recognized quality certification = Yes 0.433 0.125 0.542 0.079
/cut_1_1 -1.960 0.000 -2.143 0.000
/cut_1_2 -1.170 0.001 -1.378 0.000
/cut_1_3 -0.461 0.142 -0.690 0.037
/cut_1_4 0.675 0.017 0.392 0.239
Athrho 0.394 0.098
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 19.708
Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.001
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 1.662
Chi-sq(3) P-val = 0.645






Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.103 0.720 0.102 0.816
Size = Large >=100 0.145 0.627 0.601 0.384
City = Santa Cruz 0.751 0.001 0.662 0.022
Industry = Textiles -2.189 0.000 -2.117 0.000
Industry = Plastics & rubber -0.832 0.089 -0.934 0.049
Industry = Hotel and restaurants: section H 0.935 0.007 0.930 0.006
Industry = Transport  Section I 0.823 0.048 0.770 0.088
Percentage held by largest owner (25-49%) 1.045 0.008 1.016 0.009
Percentage held by largest owner (50-74%) 0.721 0.019 0.687 0.026
Principal Owner Gender= Female / Are any of the principal owners female?-0.791 0.000 -0.795 0.000
Internationally-recognized quality certification = Yes 1.511 0.000 1.473 0.000
Internationally-recognized quality certification = No 1.215 0.001 1.282 0.000
/cut_1_1 0.109 0.735 0.235 0.488
/cut_1_2 0.689 0.063 0.807 0.029
/cut_1_3 1.164 0.002 1.279 0.001
/cut_1_4 2.474 0.000 2.580 0.000
Athrho -0.207 0.405
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 4770.000
Chi-sq(4) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 12.609
Chi-sq(3) P-val = 0.027





Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.596 0.025 -1.413 0.000
Size = Large >=100 -1.069 0.000 -2.965 0.000
Type = Manufacturing 0.592 0.036 0.492 0.062
City = Santa Cruz 0.120 0.582 0.324 0.087
Industry = Foods 0.501 0.083 0.900 0.001
Industry = Textiles -2.349 0.000 -1.970 0.012
Legal Status = Publicly listed company -1.225 0.000 -1.209 0.026
Legal Status = Sole (propietorship) 0.015 0.972 -0.743 0.026
Legal Status = Partnership -0.243 0.227 -0.687 0.002
Percentage held by largest owner (0-24%) 0.766 0.065 1.775 0.001
Percentage held by largest owner (50-74%) 0.732 0.001 0.497 0.020
Internationally-recognized quality certification = Yes 1.105 0.000 1.033 0.000
/cut_1_1 -0.591 0.064 -1.379 0.000
/cut_1_2 -0.242 0.450 -1.093 0.000
/cut_1_3 0.961 0.002 -0.105 0.771
/cut_1_4 2.199 0.000 0.964 0.106
Athrho 1.120 0.001
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 2912.000
Chi-sq(6) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 4.293
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.508






Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 0.016 0.953 0.170 0.594
Size = Large >=100 0.484 0.052 0.826 0.034
Type = Manufacturing -1.131 0.000 -1.128 0.000
City = La Paz -0.938 0.017 -0.960 0.017
City = Santa Cruz -0.835 0.021 -0.905 0.015
Industry = Other Manufacturing 0.942 0.000 0.900 0.001
Industry = Foods 0.946 0.001 0.866 0.010
Industry = Garments 1.884 0.020 1.804 0.025
Industry = Plastics & rubber 1.430 0.016 1.341 0.029
Industry = Transport  Section I -1.024 0.023 -1.073 0.019
Legal Status = Publicly listed company -0.682 0.047 -0.735 0.034
Legal Status = Partnership 0.477 0.055 0.482 0.055
Percentage held by largest owner (50-74%) 0.587 0.014 0.575 0.017
Percentage held by largest owner (75-100%) -0.544 0.062 -0.574 0.053
Principal Owner Gender= Female / Are any of the principal owners female?-0.608 0.006 -0.614 0.006
/cut_1_1 -2.591 0.000 -2.545 0.000
/cut_1_2 -1.497 0.000 -1.468 0.000
/cut_1_3 -0.220 0.560 -0.196 0.603
/cut_1_4 0.901 0.031 0.933 0.025
Athrho -0.161 0.300
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 4626.000
Chi-sq(7) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 3.973
Chi-sq(6) P-val = 0.680





Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Size = Small >=5 and <=19
Size = Medium >=20 and <=99 -0.293 0.291 -0.504 0.180
Size = Large >=100 -0.106 0.667 -0.550 0.340
Type = Retail 0.595 0.081 0.611 0.076
City = Santa Cruz 0.389 0.095 0.447 0.041
Industry = Other Manufacturing 0.829 0.013 0.822 0.013
Industry = Textiles -2.050 0.025 -2.098 0.031
Industry = Garments -0.735 0.076 -0.655 0.105
Industry = Plastics & rubber 1.467 0.033 1.571 0.019
Industry = Construction Section F 0.938 0.043 0.946 0.025
Industry = Retail -0.933 0.097 -0.938 0.080
Percentage held by largest owner (0-24%) -1.733 0.000 -1.505 0.011
Percentage held by largest owner (50-74%) 0.514 0.043 0.532 0.030
Internationally-recognized quality certification = Yes 0.707 0.018 0.692 0.028
Internationally-recognized quality certification = No 0.776 0.010 0.694 0.023
/cut_1_1 -0.781 0.005 -0.922 0.005
/cut_1_2 0.278 0.460 0.130 0.769
/cut_1_3 1.427 0.000 1.267 0.011
/cut_1_4 2.399 0.000 2.231 0.000
Athrho 0.187 0.424
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 4536.000
Chi-sq(6) P-val = 0.000
Overidentification test Hansen J statistic: 2.457
Chi-sq(5) P-val = 0.652
Underidentification Test and Overidentification Test calculated on a IV-linear model.
Inadequately Educated Workforce
OProbit IV-OProbit
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